This memorandum details Norman Cousins’ observations and discussions during his trip to Nigeria and Biafra during the Civil War. In his report, Cousins outlines his humanitarian initiative called Aid to Biafran Children (ABC) designed to address severe malnutrition among children in Biafra. He provides firsthand accounts of meetings with key figures such as Biafran officials, notably Ojukwu, and Nigerian military leader General Gowon. Although both sides publicly uphold rigid positions, Cousins suggests there is a subtle willingness to negotiate, hinting at a possible breakthrough if both parties can engage in discreet dialogue. He also points to critical logistical challenges, including the difficulty of transporting vital medical supplies into conflict areas, and underscores the potential role of external influences especially the U. S. in helping to facilitate peace.

The United States of America played a non-interventionist role in the Nigeria‐Biafra Civil War. Its main policy was centered on avoiding direct interference, refusing to take sides, and promoting peaceful resolution through negotiations. The U.S. refused to supply arms to the Federal Government of Nigeria (FMG) or to recognize Biafra's secession. The purpose of this was to maintain good relations with all ethnic groups in Nigeria, and avoid setting a precedent for interfering in internal conflicts. While this approach strained U.S. relations with the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, it was seen as preventing greater risks and preserving broader U.S. interests in Africa.