This memorandum, prepared by Henry Kissinger, U.S. Assistant for National Security Affairs, presents options for U.S. relief efforts in the Nigeria–Biafra Civil War, weighing their pros and cons. The first option supports the Federal Government with funding and diplomacy while avoiding direct involvement, assuming a Federal victory but risking humanitarian crises. The second shifts toward Biafra by increasing aid and pressuring Nigeria but could escalate the war and strain U.S. relations. The third backs Nigeria with military and diplomatic support, potentially ending the war quickly but damaging U.S. credibility and worsening humanitarian issues. The final approach prioritizes relief and peace negotiations, balancing humanitarian aid with diplomacy, though it risks rejection and accusations of foreign interference. In this memorandum, Kissinger leans toward this last option as the most practical path forward.

The United States of America played a non-interventionist role in the Nigerian Civil War. Its main policy was centered on avoiding direct interference, refusing to take sides, and promoting peaceful resolution through negotiations. The U.S. refused to supply arms to the Federal Government of Nigeria (FMG) or to recognize Biafra's secession. The purpose of this was to maintain good relations with all ethnic groups in Nigeria, and avoid setting a precedent for interfering in internal conflicts. While this approach strained U.S. relations with the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, it was seen as preventing greater risks and preserving broader U.S. interests in Africa.